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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
VOLUME CIV, NO. 3, MARCH 2007 
?H 
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS AND TEAM AGENCY* 
ollective intentions are those intentions associated with joint 
actions. The paradigm cases include two people singing a 
V^>* duet, painting a house, pushing a car, and taking a walk 
together. In these situations, there is a sense in which "we" intend the 
joint action, as well as a sense in which "I" intend my part in it. For 
instance, if we go to Edinburgh together and, as a part of this, I check 
the train timetable and you buy the tickets, then there is a sense in 
which our actions result from "our" intention to go to Edinburgh. 
This collective intention is not reducible to the summation of our 
individual intentions and, as such, is unlike the case where two agents 
happen to do the same thing independently. For instance, if I plan to 
go to Edinburgh and coincidentally meet you on the train, there is a 
use of the word 4we' in which it may be that "we went to Edinburgh" 
because "I went to Edinburgh" and "you went to Edinburgh," but this 
is not a joint action and the intentions behind it are not collective 
intentions. Analyses of collective intentions seek to elucidate the 
features that are peculiar to the joint action case and to explain how 
collective intentions are connected to individual intentions. 
The literature on collective intentions is exemplified by the work of 
Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller,1 John Searle,2 and Michael Bratman.3 
A general problem for these accounts is how to differentiate collective 
intentions from the mutually-consistent individual intentions that 
lie behind Nash equilibrium behavior in games. In game theory, the 
*We would like to thank Nick Bardsley, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Philip 
Pettit, and Wlodek Rabinowicz for helpful discussions. 
lrruomela and Miller, "We-intentions," Philosophical Studies, liii (1988): 367-89. 
2Searle, "Collective Intentions and Actions," in Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, 
Martha E. Pollack, eds., Intentions in Communication (Cambridge: MIT, 1990), pp. 401-15. 3 
Bratman, "Shared Cooperative Activity," Philosophical Review, ci (1992): 327-41, and 
"Shared Intention," Ethics, civ (1993): 97-113. 
0022-362X/07/0403/109-37 ? 2007 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 
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110 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
behavior of the players of a noncooperative game is defined to be in 
Nash equilibrium if each player's chosen strategy is optimal for her, 
given the strategies chosen by the others. Nash equilibrium is usually 
interpreted as a situation in which each player acts as a rational 
individual agent, holding true beliefs about the actions of the others. 
It is clear that not all Nash equilibria are joint actions. However, the 
core analyses provided by Tuomela and Miller, Searle, and Bratman 
seem to imply that all Nash equilibrium situations are instances of 
collective intentions. Cases in which Nash equilibria are not joint ac 
tions are excluded only by stipulation or by the addition of further 
conditions which are just as problematic as the original concept of 
collective intention. Tuomela and Miller stipulate that the definition 
of collective intention includes the condition that the action is joint, 
Searle that collective intentions involve cooperation in pursuit of 
collective goals. This amounts to saying that the special feature of 
collective intentions that distinguishes them from the intentions 
behind Nash equilibrium behavior is that they are associated with 
cooperative activity, but this is something that we already knew prior to 
the analysis. Bratman adds conditions which require each agent to be 
responsive to the behavior of the other as the joint action proceeds and 
if unexpected problems occur, but these conditions are stated only 
informally, and rely on a pre-analytic understanding of the nature of 
cooperative activity.4 
We shall argue that these problems arise because, in the literature 
of collective intentions, the focus is on the properties of these inten 
tions as mental states, rather than on the mental processes by which 
they were formed. Thus, anything that is distinctive to cooperative ac 
tivity has to be represented as a distinctive feature of the correspond 
ing intentions. An alternative approach is to analyze the practical 
reasoning by which individual agents choose to engage in cooperative 
activity and then to consider whether this reasoning has special fea 
tures which lead to collective intentions. 
A starting point for such an analysis can be found in a body of 
decision-theoretic literature on team agency. This seeks to extend stan 
dard game theory, where each individual asks separately "What 
should /do?" to allow teams of individuals to count as agents and for 
players to ask the question "What should we do?" This leads to team 
reasoning, a distinctive mode of reasoning that is used by members of 
teams, and which may result in cooperative actions. When an agent 
deliberates about what she ought to do, the result of her reasoning 
4 
Bratman, "Shared Cooperative Activity." 
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is an intention. An intention is interposed between reasoning and 
action, so it is natural to treat the intentions that result from team 
reasoning as collective intentions. The concept of intention seems to 
imply not reasoning again, or at least that the result of reasoning is 
a default plan which is revised only under special circumstances. So, 
if the distinctive feature of collective intentions is to be found in the 
reasoning by which they were formed, then an analysis that focuses on 
the intentions themselves will miss the feature that makes collective 
intentions collective. In this paper, we will show how team reasoning 
fills the gaps in the collective intention literature and provide a frame 
work in which various theories of group agency can be compared. 
I. COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
An early analysis of collective intentionality is the work of Tuomela 
and Miller {op. cit). The essential features of this analysis can be 
presented as follows for the case of a two member group, whose 
members are PI and P2. Consider some "joint social action" A which 
comprises actions Ai and A2 for the respective individuals. According 
to Tuomela and Miller, PI has a we-intentionwixh respect to A if: (i) PI 
intends to do A1? (ii) PI believes that P2 will do A2, (iii) PI believes 
that P2 believes that PI will do A\, and so on {op. cit., p. 375). This 
analysis reduces we-intentions to individual intentions and a network 
of mutual beliefs. 
An unsatisfactory feature of this analysis is that it seems to treat 
every Nash equilibrium as a case of collective intentionality. In a Nash 
equilibrium, each individual's action is a best response to her true 
beliefs about the other's action. Since these are intentional actions, 
this is equivalent to saying that each individual's intention is adapted 
to her true beliefs about the actions of the other. For example, con 
sider the version of the Hawk-Dove game shown in Figure 1 (following). 
As an example of such a game, think of two individuals in a state of 
nature who come into conflict over some valuable resource. To play 
dove is to offer to share the resource but to back down if the other 
attempts to take it all; to play hawk is to demand the whole resource, 
backed by a readiness to fight for it. We assume that fighting is costly 
for both parties, and that the utility value of a half share of the 
resource is greater than half of the utility value of the whole. 
This game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: {hawk, dove) and 
{dove, hawk). Consider the first of these. Suppose it is common knowl 
edge between PI and P2 that, in interactions like this, the player in 
the position of PI almost always chooses hawk and the one in the 
position of P2 almost always chooses dove. Expecting P2 to play dove, 
PI forms the intention to play hawk. Expecting PI to play hawk, P2 
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P2 
dove hawk 
PI dove 2,2 
3, 0 
0,3 
-5, -5 hawk 
Figure 1: Hawk-Dove 
forms the intention to play dove. Given all this, does each player have a 
we-intention with respect to the pair of strategies (hawk, dove)} On 
Tuomela and Miller's analysis, it seems that they do. 
The problem becomes even more acute when we consider the Pris 
oner's Dilemma, a two-person version of which is shown in Figure 2. 
As an example of such a game, think of two individuals who must 
each decide how much of a valuable resource to take. This resource 
renews itself each season but the amount available next season will 
depend on how much is left at the end of this one (think of fish in the 
sea). Payoffs reflect the amount of the resource that each player gets 
over two seasons. To play cooperate is to take a moderate amount of the 
resource this season; to play defect is to take a large amount. The rate 
of depletion is such that, if only one player takes a large amount then 
the increased amount she gets this season outweighs the decrease 
next season, but if one player takes a large amount this season then 
the other player does better by also taking a large amount now before 
the resource becomes depleted. For each player, whatever the other 
player does, her best move is to play defect. However, the outcome in 
which both players defect and the resource is severely depleted is worse 
for each player than that in which they both cooperate and conserve 
enough of the resource to renew itself for next 
season. 
The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is (defect, defect). So, in the 
Nash equilibrium, PI will form the intention to play defect. Because 
playing defect is a dominant strategy, if there is common knowledge 
of rationality, PI will expect P2 to do likewise (though it is in her best 
interests to form the intention to defect regardless of her expectation 
about P2's action). So, again, the Nash equilibrium behavior seems 
to fall under Tuomela and Miller's analysis of collective intentions. 
But, intuitively, the exploitation of the resource is not a joint action. 
It is not true to say that each player intends that "we" exploit the com 
mon resource. Conversely, the non-Nash equilibrium cooperative prac 
tice of conserving the resource does involve a collective intention. 
Although Tuomela and Miller's core analysis seems to include the 
intentions behind the Nash equilibria in these games, it comes with 
various qualifications. In particular, it applies only to "joint social 
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P2 
cooperate defect 
PI cooperate 3,3 1,4 
defect 4, 1 2,2 
Figure 2: The Prisoner's Dilemma 
actions," defined as "situations in which some agents act together, 
usually or often with the purpose of achieving some joint goal" {op. cit., 
p. 367); this goal is "normally (but not necessarily) the goal to perform 
the total action [in our notation, A]" {op. cit., p. 370). Tuomela and 
Miller also add a condition to the effect that when PI performs A1? "he 
does it in order for the participating agents to succeed in doing [A]" 
{op. cit., p. 376). These conditions may rule out some dominant 
strategy Nash equilibria as cases of collective intention. For example, 
in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma, one might deny that PI plays 
defectin order for PI and P2 to succeed in playing {defect, defect); rather, 
PI plays defect because that is best for him, irrespective of what P2 
does. Possibly, these conditions are also intended to exclude cases like 
the Hawk-Dove example; but if so, how these cases are excluded 
remains obscure. 
Searle also criticizes Tuomela and Miller's analysis for including 
cases where there is no collective intentionality {op. cit). He pro 
poses that we-intentions cannot be reduced to such combinations of 
I-intentions and beliefs?that we-intentions are "primitive" because of 
their distinct phenomenology {op. cit., p. 404)?and undertakes an 
analysis of his own. The critique is persuasive at the intuitive level but, 
on closer inspection, turns out to be question-begging. Searle says 
that, in cases of collective intentionality, individual I-intentions are 
"derivative from" we-intentions "in a way we will need to explain" 
{op. cit., p. 403). He then analyzes collective intentions with reference 
to a case in which Jones and Smith are preparing a hollandaise sauce 
together, Jones stirring while Smith pours. Searle suggests that the 
we-intention to make the sauce by means of Jones's stirring is like 
an intention to fire a gun by means of pulling the trigger. The dis 
tinctive problem of collective intentions is how to characterize each 
individual's intention without having either Jones's individual inten 
tion causing the whole joint action or having Jones intend Smith's 
action, and vice versa. On Searle's analysis, Jones's description of 
what is going on is "We make the sauce by means of Me stirring and 
You pouring," and the intention in Jones's mind is: "We intend to 
make the sauce by means of Me stirring" {op. cit., p. 412). The idea 
This content downloaded from 195.191.67.226 on Tue, 15 Jul 2014 12:55:07 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
114 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
seems to be that the I-intention to stir is part o/the we-intention to 
make the sauce. This is not quite the derivation of I-intentions from 
we-intentions that Searle said we needed. 
Whatever one makes of this analysis, it does not resolve the prob 
lem with which Searle began. We can still ask why, in the Hawk-Dove 
example, PI and P2 do not have a collective intention with respect to 
(hawk, dove). What is wrong with saying that, in Pi's mind, there is a 
we-intention to play the combination (hawk, dove) by means of PI 
playing hawk and P2 playing dove} Searle asserts that "the notion of a 
we-intention...implies the notion of cooperation" (op. cit, p. 406) and 
says that cooperation is construed in terms of "collective goals" (op. cit., 
pp. 405, 411), so he might answer that, in playing the strategy com 
bination (hawk, dove), PI and P2 are not "cooperating" in pursuit of 
a "collective goal." But those concepts are left unanalyzed. 
So Searle's analysis, like Tuomela and Miller's, distinguishes be 
tween genuinely collective intentions and the individual intentions 
of Nash equilibrium only by appealing to an intuitive understanding 
of the concepts of "cooperation" (or "joint action") and "collective 
goal" or ("joint goal"). From the perspective of the literature of col 
lective intentionality, the problem is to find a way of making the 
cooperative pursuit of a collective goal a property of the correspond 
ing intention. The difficulties that these writers have found in grap 
pling with this problem suggest that a different line of approach 
might be more useful. Our approach will be to analyze the nature of 
practical reasoning associated with the pursuit of a collective goal, 
and then to investigate the intentions that it produces. 
Bratman offers a rather different account of collective intention 
ality in his analysis of "shared cooperative activity." For Bratman, the 
key feature of shared cooperative activity is that, for each agent, I must 
intend that we / "in part because of your intention that we /."5 This 
must be known by both agents. (In "Shared Intention," there is an 
explicit common knowledge condition. This much gets us the core 
analysis of View 3 in that paper.) It is not clear that Bratman's basic 
analysis, any more than Tuomela and Miller's or Searle's, excludes 
Nash equilibrium play in Hawk-Dove. In Nash equilibrium, each indi 
vidual's action is adapted to her beliefs about the actions of the other 
and, since these are intentional actions, that is equivalent to saying 
that each individual's intention is adapted to her beliefs about the 
intentions of the other. If PI intends the Nash equilibrium outcome 
5"Shared Cooperative Activity," p. 333 (with italics); "Shared Intention," p. 104 
(without italics). 
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(hawk, dove), and believes that this outcome will come about in part 
because P2 will play dove, and that P2 will play dove because he 
intends to, and that P2 intends to play dove because he intends 
the outcome (hawk, dove) and because he believes that (hawk, dove) 
will come about in part because PI will play hawk, and so on, then it 
seems that playing (hawk, dove) will be a shared cooperative activity in 
Bratman's sense. Bratman might object that it is too glib to interpret 
Pi's intending that /come about "because of P2's intention as the 
idea that PI believes that P2 has the corresponding intention and acts 
on the basis of this belief. But his expansion of it?"I intend that our 
performance of the joint activity be in part explained by your in 
tention that we perform the joint activity; I intend that you partici 
pate as an intentional agent in a joint activity that, as I know, you too 
intend"6?is opaque. The subsequent discussion reveals that PI must 
intend the "efficacy" of P2's intention, or that the outcome is achieved 
through P2's intention to achieve it. It is not clear how this would 
exclude there being a collective intention with respect to the pair of 
strategies (hawk, dove). 
An alternative response is that the Hawk-Dove case is excluded 
from the scope of Bratman's analysis because the two players move 
once only, and simultaneously. Bratman uses what he calls a "plan 
ning conception of intention,"7 whereby an intention is an action 
guiding mental state that is maintained over an interval of time; the 
cooperative activities that he has in mind are ones in which individ 
uals coordinate their actions over time. Thus, for example, someone 
might have an individual intention to paint her house; this inten 
tion would then guide the formation of "sub-plans" for buying paint, 
cleaning walls, and so on. Analogously, Bratman argues that "we" 
might have a collective intention to paint the house which guides the 
formation of "my" and "your" sub-plans.8 In game-theoretic terms, 
this transforms the problem into one of dynamic choice. We might 
represent the shared cooperative activity as a possible outcome of an 
extended game comprising a sequence of "stage games" (for instance, 
a series of Hawk-Dove games), with a stage-game strategy counting 
as a "subplan." Bratman says that the subplans of players A and B 
for a joint action / mesh if there is some way that "we could / that 
would...involve the successful execution of those subplans."9 So the 
6 
"Shared Intention," p. 104. 7 
"Shared Cooperative Activity," pp. 330-31. 8 
Adding these subplans gets the schema on pp. 333-34 of "Shared Cooperative 
Activity," and View 4 in "Shared Intention." 9 
"Shared Cooperative Activity," p. 332; "Shared Intention," p. 106. 
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intentions behind a sequence of Nash equilibria in the stage games 
(for instance, "we intend to perform the sequence in which, in every 
stage game, A plays hawk, B plays dove") would be a collective intention. 
However, it is clear that Bratman would not be happy with this 
characterization of his views. He says that his view implies more than 
that each player "sees the other's intentions as data for [her] de 
liberations, albeit as data that are potentially affected by [her] own 
decision"?in other words, it requires more than Nash equilibrium. It 
requires that each agent "aims at the efficacy of the intention of the 
other" and "embrace [s] as her own end the efficacy of the other's 
relevant intention."10 How he would discriminate between shared 
intentions and Nash equilibrium behavior is clearer in his "Shared 
Cooperative Activity" paper, which includes further conditions, par 
ticularly that each agent's intention is "minimally cooperatively sta 
ble" (op. ext., p. 338). This requires that there are at least some 
circumstances in which she would help the other agent if a new 
problem arose. Bratman also specifies that the agents' attitudes have 
to be appropriately connected to the joint action which, he says, 
explicitly distinguishes shared cooperative activity from the kind of 
"pre-packaged cooperation" that can be represented by the choice of 
strategies in a game. If our roles in an activity are fully determined in 
advance and we can each carry out our part with no further inter 
action then, whilst the planning stage may have been a shared co 
operative activity, the noninteractive performance of the plan itself 
is pre-packaged cooperation. Although both shared cooperative ac 
tivity and pre-packaged cooperation involve our bringing about that 
we / through "mutual responsiveness of intention," shared cooper 
ative activity involves the additional feature of "mutual responsiveness 
in action." To illustrate mutual responsiveness in action, Bratman 
gives the example of singing a duet, each singer accommodating 
herself to the actions of the other. The intuition is clear enough, but 
there is no analysis of how mutual responsiveness works. So the sta 
tus of mutual responsiveness is similar to that of "collective intention" 
and "joint action" prior to Bratman's work?something we have an 
intuitive understanding of, but want an analysis of. 
We are also left wondering how Bratman's project relates to other 
analyses of collective intentions. He differentiates it from the analyses 
provided by Tuomela and Miller and Searle by saying that his shared 
intentions are states of affairs made up of the interrelated intentions 
and beliefs of the people who share them; they are not intentions of a 
10 
"Shared Intention," p. 107. 
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special kind, held by individual agents.11 However, we see Bratman's 
use of the planning conception of intention as a much more funda 
mental distinction, in that it makes collective intentions prior to 
practical reasoning about cooperative activity. We will argue that his 
theory may be best understood as one which analyzes group agency in 
terms of the mental states of the individual agents that compose the 
group, and which provides the background circumstances in which 
individual agents use team reasoning. 
II. TEAM REASONING 
In decision theory, it is almost universally presupposed that agency is 
invested in individuals: each person acts on her own preferences and 
beliefs. A person's preferences may take account of the effects of her 
actions on other people; she may, for example, be altruistic or have an 
aversion to inequality. Still, these are /^preferences, and she chooses 
what she most prefers. Opposing this orthodoxy is a small body of 
literature which allows groups or "teams" of individuals to count as 
agents, and which seeks to identify distinctive modes of team rea 
soning that are used by individuals as members of teams. This idea 
has been around for some time, having been proposed in different 
forms by David Hodgson,12 Donald Regan,13 Margaret Gilbert,14 Susan 
Hurley,15 Robert Sugden,16 Martin Hollis,17 Michael Bacharach,18 and 
Elizabeth Anderson.19 One motivation for theories of team reasoning 
is that there are games that are puzzles for orthodox decision theory, 
in the sense that there exists some strategy that is at least arguably 
rational and that a substantial number of people play in real life, but 
whose rationality decision theory cannot explain and whose play it 
cannot predict. These are puzzles of cooperation, in that the strategies 
offer what Bacharach calls scope for common gain, or the possibility of 
making a Pare to improvement (that is, at least one player is made 
""Shared Intention," pp. 99, 103. 12 
Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism (New York: Oxford, 1967). 13 
Regan, Utilitarianism and Cooperation (New York: Oxford, 1980). 14 
Gilbert, On Social Facts (New York: Roudedge, 1989). 15 
Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford, 1989). 
16Sugden, "Thinking as a Team: Toward an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior," 
Social Philosophy and Policy, x (1993): 69-89; "The Logic of Team Reasoning," Philo 
sophical Explorations, vi (2003): 165-81. 
17Hollis, Trust within Reason (New York: Cambridge, 1998). 18 
Bacharach, "Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Coop 
eration," Research in Economics, liii (1999): 117-47; Beyond Individual Choice, Natalie 
Gold and Robert Sugden, eds., (Princeton: University Press, 2006). 19 
Anderson, "Unstrapping the Straitjacket of 'Preference': A Comment on Amartya 
Sen's Contributions to Philosophy and Economics," Economics and Philosophy, xvn (2001): 
21-38. 
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better off and no player is made worse off) on an outcome predicted 
by a standard solution concept (op. cit.). 
One such puzzle is the Prisoner's Dilemma. Conventional game 
theory predicts that players will always choose defect, while in fact many 
players choose cooperate. There is scope for common gain because if 
both players choose cooperate then they are both better off than if they 
both choose defect. In experiments in which people play the Prisoner's 
Dilemma for money, anonymously and without repetition, the pro 
portion of participants choosing cooperate is typically between 40 and 
50 percent.20 The theory is failing to explain observed behavior in 
games. There is a parallel problem for normative game theory. The 
theory prescribes defect, but many people have the strong intuition 
that cooperate is the rational choice. Of course, it is open to the game 
theorist to argue that that intuition is mistaken, and to insist on the 
normative validity of the standard analysis. In doing so, the game 
theorist can point out that any individual player of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma does better by choosing defect than by choosing cooperate, 
irrespective of the behavior of her opponent. In other words, each 
individual player can reason to the conclusion: "The action that gives 
the best result for me is defect." But, against that, it can be said with 
equal truth that the two players of the game both do better by their 
both choosing cooperate than by their both choosing defect. Thus, each 
player can also reason to the conclusion: "The pair of actions that 
gives the best result for us is not (defect, defect) 
"n It seems that nor 
mative argument between these two positions leads to a stand-off. 
A second puzzle is the game of Hi-Lo. This is a game in which each 
player chooses one element from the same set of labels. As in a pure 
coordination game, the two players get the same strictly positive 
payoff if both choose the same label and (0, 0) otherwise. However 
(and in contrast to a pure coordination game, in which all labels give 
the same payoff), there is one label that gives a strictly higher pay 
off from coordination for each player than the others. Figure 3 
shows a simple version of Hi-Lo, in which there are just two labels, 
high and low. 
Hi-Lo combines features of pure coordination games and the Pris 
oner's Dilemma. Like a pure coordination game, this is a common interest 
game?that is, a game in which the interests of the players are perfectly 
20 David Sally, "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis 
of Experiments from 1958 to 1992," Rationality and Society, vn (1995): 58-92. 21 In order to conclude that {cooperate, cooperate) is the best pair of strategies for them, 
the players have to judge the payoff combinations (4, 1) and (1, 4) to be worse "for 
them" than (3, 3). 
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Player 2 
high low 
Player 1 high 2,2 0,0 
low 0,0 1,1 
Figure 3: Hi-Lo 
aligned, signalled by the fact that, in each cell of the payoff matrix, 
the two players' payoffs are equal to one another. There are two pure 
strategy Nash equilibria, each associated with a different label and 
coming about if both players choose that label. In this sense, Hi-Lo 
poses a coordination problem: each player wants it to be the case 
that they both choose the same label. The crucial difference from a 
pure coordination game is that, in Hi-Lo, one of the equilibria is 
strictly better than the other for both players. At first sight, this 
makes the coordination problem in Hi-Lo trivial: it seems obvious 
that the players should coordinate on the equilibrium they both 
prefer, namely (high, high). 
Hi-Lo shares with the Prisoner's Dilemma the feature that, of the 
outcomes that occur if both players choose the same label, one is 
better than the other for both players. In this sense, Hi-Lo poses a 
cooperation problem: there is scope for common gain because both 
players benefit by their both choosing high rather than low just as, in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma, both players benefit by their both choosing 
cooperate rather than defect. The difference is that in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, (cooperate, cooperate) is not a Nash equilbrium while in Hi 
Lo, (high, high) is. It might seem that, because of this difference, the 
cooperation problem in Hi-Lo is trivial too. 
Certainly, Hi-Lo does not pose practical problems for ordinary 
people, either individually or collectively. In experiments in which 
participants play Hi-Lo games, and in which the high and low strat 
egies are given neutral labels, the overwhelming majority choose 
high.22 But Hi-Lo presents a fundamental problem for game theory. 
From the assumptions that the players are perfectly rational (in the 
normal sense of maximizing expected payoff) and that they have 
common knowledge of their rationality, we cannot deduce that each 
22 
Nicholas Bardsley, Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer, and Sugden, "The Nature of 
Salience Revisited: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning" (unpublished 
manuscript, 2006), report an experiment where 56 student subjects were presented 
with two Hi-Lo games. In one game, the ratio of the money payoffs to high and low was 
10:1; in the other it was 10:9. In each case, 54 subjects (96 percent) chose high. 
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will choose high. Or, expressing the same idea in normative terms, 
there is no sequence of steps of valid reasoning by which perfectly 
rational players can arrive at the conclusion that they ought to choose 
high. Many people find this claim incredible, but it is true. It is true 
because, from the assumption of rationality, all we can infer is that 
each player chooses the strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, 
given her beliefs about what the other player will do. All we can say in 
favor of high is that, if either player expects the other to choose high, 
then it is rational for the first player to choose high too; thus, a shared 
expectation of Azg-?-choosing is self-fulfilling among rational players. 
But exactly the same can be said about low. Intuitively, it seems 
obvious that each player should choose high because both prefer the 
outcome of (high, high) to that of (low, low)', but that 'because' has no 
standing in the formal theory.23 
If we are prepared to relax the classical assumption of perfect 
rationality, it is not particularly difficult to construct theories which 
purport to explain the choice of high. After we have stripped out any 
information contained in their labels, the only difference between 
the high and low strategies is that high is associated with higher payoffs; 
because of this, most plausible theories of imperfect rationality 
predict that high is more likely to be chosen than low.24 But it seems 
unsatisfactory to have to invoke assumptions about imperfections of 
rationality in order to explain behavior in such a transparently simple 
game as Hi-Lo. If we find that standard game-theoretic reasoning 
cannot tell players how to solve the apparently trivial problem of 
coordination and cooperation posed by Hi-Lo, we may begin to 
suspect that something is fundamentally wrong with the whole 
analysis of coordination and cooperation provided by the standard 
theory. Conversely, if we could find a form of reasoning which 
recommends high in Hi-Lo, that might provide the key to solving the 
problem posed by the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
The source of both puzzles seems to be located in the mode of 
reasoning by which, in the standard theory, individuals move from 
preferences to decisions. In the syntax of game theory, each indi 
vidual must ask separately "What should / do?" In Hi-Lo, the game 
23 For fuller statements of this argument, see Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism; 
Sugden, "Thinking as a Team: Toward an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior"; or 
Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice. 24 For example, suppose that each player believes that his opponent is just as likely to 
choose one strategy as the other. Then both will choose high. Or suppose that each 
player believes that his opponent believes that he is just as likely to choose one strategy 
as the other. Then each player will expect his opponent to choose high, and so choose 
high as a best reply. Or.... 
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theoretic answer to this question is indeterminate. In the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, the answer is that defect should be chosen. Intuitively, how 
ever, it seems possible for the players to ask a different question: 
"What should we do?" In Hi-Lo, the answer to this question is surely: 
"Choose {high, high)" In the Prisoner's Dilemma, "Choose (cooperate, 
cooperate)" seems to be at least credible as an answer. Theories of 
team agency try to reformulate game theory in such a way that "What 
should we do?" is a meaningful question. The basic idea is that, when 
an individual reasons as a member of a team, she considers which 
combination of actions by members of the team would best promote 
the team's objective, and then performs her part of that combination. 
The rationality of each individual's action derives from the rationality 
of the joint action of the team. In the same way that individual rea 
soning leads to individual intentions, it is natural to suppose that 
team reasoning leads to collective intentions. In this section of the 
paper we show how the we-intentions of individual agents would arise 
as the result of team reasoning. 
We represent team reasoning explicitly, as a mode of reasoning 
in which propositions are manipulated according to well-defined 
rules?an approach that has previously been used by Natalie Gold 
and Christian List.25 Our basic building block is the concept of a 
schema of practical reasoning, in which conclusions about what actions 
should be taken are inferred from explicit premises about the de 
cision environment and about what agents are seeking to achieve. In 
propositional logic, a rule of inference?a rule that allows us to derive 
conclusions from premises?is valid if, whenever the premises are 
true, so are the conclusions that are derived from them. One can 
formulate principles of practical reasoning which satisfy analogous 
criteria of validity. Following Bacharach, we define a mode of prac 
tical reasoning for a given class of games as valid if it is success 
promoting, given any game in that class, it yields only choices which 
tend to produce success, as measured by game payoffs.26 The funda 
mental idea is that practical reasoning infers conclusions about what 
an agent ought to do from premises which include propositions 
about what the agent is seeking to achieve. Such reasoning is instru 
mental in that it takes the standard of success as given; its conclusions 
are propositions about what the agent should do in order to be as 
successful as possible according to that standard. If the agent is an 
25 Gold and List, "Framing as Path-Dependence," Economics and Philosophy, xx (2004): 
253-77. 
26 
Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice, pp. 7-10. 
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individual person, the reasoning is individually instrumental Here is a 
simple example of individually instrumental reasoning, in which (1) to 
(4) are premises and the proposition below the line is the conclusion: 
Schema 1: Individual Rationality 
(1) 1 must choose either left or right. 
(2) If I choose left, the outcome will be Oi. 
(3) If I choose right, the outcome will be 02. 
(4) I want to achieve Oi more than I want to achieve 02. 
I should choose left. 
In our analysis, we will interpret the "official" payoffs of a game (as 
represented in the matrix which defines the game, Figures 1, 2 and 3 
being examples) as specifying what the players want to achieve as 
individuals or, equivalently, what counts as success for them. Follow 
ing the conventions of game theory, we will treat payoffs as utility 
indices in the sense of expected utility theory so that, in situations 
of uncertainty, a player's success is measured by the expected value 
of her payoff. 
Now consider the following schema, in which (left, right) denotes 
the pair of actions "I choose left, you choose righf: 
Schema 2: Collective Rationality 
(1) We must choose one of (left, left), (left, right), (right, left) or 
(right, right). 
(2) If we choose (left, left) the outcome will be Oi. 
(3) If we choose (left, right) the outcome will be 02. 
(4) If we choose (right, left) the outcome will be 03. 
(5) If we choose (right, right) the outcome will be 04. 
(6) We want to achieve Oi more than we to achieve 02, 03, or 04. 
We should choose (left, left). 
Is this schema valid? Given the symmetries between Schemata 1 and 2, 
it seems that, if one is valid, so too is the other. Both present instru 
mental practical reasoning, where an agent deliberates about what to 
do in order to achieve its goals. The only difference is the level of 
agency. If Schema 1 represents valid reasoning for an individual agent, 
Schema 2 is its parallel for a group agent. 
As far as we can see, the only grounds for objecting to Schema 2 
while accepting Schema 1 is to claim that the concept of group 
agency itself is incoherent. This claim can construed in two differ 
ent ways. 
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On the first construal, the claim is that expressions such as 'we 
want to achieve' and 'we should choose' are mysterious, because 
wanting and choosing are mental states and mental states must 
be located in individual minds. In the rest of this section of the 
paper, we try to answer this objection by showing how the "we" 
concepts of Schema 2 correspond with "I" concepts. We assert that 
Schemata 1 and 2 are both forms of valid instrumental reasoning 
and that they are valid for agents, defined as those entities that use 
these modes of reasoning (individual agents in one case, group 
agents in the other). 
On the second construal, it is a claim about social ontology. The 
counter-claim that groups can be agents in this metaphysical sense is 
defended by Carol Rovane27 and Philip Pettit.28 For both Rovane and 
Pettit, an agent is characterized by a commitment to "rational unity"; 
it can be any entity that has the ability to form states that play the role 
of intentional attitudes, such as judgments and beliefs, and that can 
take steps to ensure that these states are consistent with each other. 
If the defining feature of agency is the ability to engage in rational 
deliberation, then the bounds of agency need not coincide with the 
individual. Rovane and Pettit's is a normative concept of agency; it 
presupposes principles of rationality which are constitutive of being 
an agent, and derives the metaphysical possibility of group agency 
from these principles. 
In this paper, we do not make any ontological or metaphysical 
claims; rather, we describe a type of reasoning which the members 
of group agents use. This means that we are using a more inclusive 
definition of group agent than Rovane and Pettit. On their definition 
some of the examples of ephemeral groups in the collective inten 
tions literature, such as two strangers pushing a car, will not exhibit 
agency. But these groups may use team reasoning. In section in, we 
will present a range of alternative accounts of what group agency is 
and how it comes about; some of these accounts are compatible with 
Rovane and Pettit's definition, while others are not. In this section, 
we confine ourselves to showing that there are practical reasoning 
schemata that use "we" concepts, which individual people can (and, 
we claim, sometimes do) use, which are similar in structure to modes 
of individual practical reasoning. 
We begin by noting what might seem to be a potential contra 
diction between Schemata 1 and 2. For example, consider the 
27Rovane, The Bounds of Agency (Princeton: University Press, 1988). 
28Pettit, Weakness of the Will and Practical Irrationality (New York: Oxford, 2003). 
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Prisoner's Dilemma. Using a variant of Schema 1, each player can 
apparently reason to "I should choose defect"; but using a variant of 
Schema 2, each can apparently reason to "We should not choose 
(defect, defect)." We suggest that the resolution of this problem is that, 
properly understood, the two sets of premises are mutually in 
consistent.29 Thus, while both schemata are valid, they cannot be 
used simultaneously to infer contradictory conclusions. The prem 
ises of Schema 1 presuppose that / am an agent, pursuing my ob 
jectives. Those of Schema 2 presuppose that we make up a single 
unit of agency, pursuing our objectives. But instrumental practi 
cal reasoning presupposes a unit of agency. If I am to reason in 
strumentally, I cannot simultaneously think of myself both as a unit 
of agency in my own right and as part of a unit of agency which 
includes you.30 
We can make this feature of practical reasoning more transparent 
by writing schemata in forms which include premises about agency. 
Consider any situation in which each of a set S of individuals has a 
set of alternative actions, from which he must choose one. A profile of 
actions assigns to each member of S one element of his set of alter 
native actions. For each profile, there is an outcome, understood simply 
as the state of affairs that comes about (for everyone) if those actions 
are chosen.31 We define a payoff function as a function which assigns a 
numerical value to every outcome. A payoff function is to be inter 
preted as representing what some specific agent wants to achieve: if 
one outcome has a higher numerical value than another, then the 
relevant agent wants to achieve the first more than he (or she, or it) 
wants to achieve the second.32 Now consider any individual i, and any 
29 
Gold shows a technical sense in which this is so, within a model of reasoning 
involving the manipulation of propositions in Framing and Decision Making: A Reason 
Based Approach (Unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 2005). 30 
This is not to deny the psychological possibility that a person might simulta 
neously experience motivational or affective pulls towards both individual and group 
identity. Our claim is merely that such conflicting pulls cannot be resolved by instrumental 
reasoning. Consider an analogous case in conventional choice theory. What if an indi 
vidual faces a choice between two options, feels motivational pulls towards each of 
them, but cannot settle on any firm preference (or on a firm attitude of indifference)? 
Clearly, this case is psychologically possible; but if a person is unsure of her own ob 
jectives, instrumental rationality cannot tell her what they should be. 31 In game-theoretic language, this is a game form. A game form consists of a set of 
players, a set of alternative strategies for each player, and, for each profile of strategies 
that the players might choose, an outcome. In contrast, a game is normally defined so 
that, for each profile of strategies, there is a vector of numerical payoffs, one payoff for 
each player. 32 
Thus, the "official" payoffs of a game are the values of payoff functions which rep 
resent what each player would want to achieve as an individual agent. 
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set of individuals G, such that i is a member of G and G is a weak 
subset of S. We will say that i identifies with G if i conceives of G as a unit 
of agency, acting as a single entity in pursuit of some single objective. 
Finally, we define common knowledge in the usual way: a proposition x 
is common knowledge in a set of individuals G if: (i) x is true; (ii) for 
all individuals i in G, i knows x; (iii) for all individuals i and j in G, 
i knows that j knows x; (iv) for all individuals i j, and k in G, i knows 
that j knows that k knows that x; and so on. 
Letting A stand for any profile and U for any payoff function, 
consider the following schema: 
Schema 3: Simple Team Reasoning (from a group viewpoint) 
(1) We are the members of S. 
(2) Each of us identifies with S. 
(3) Each of us wants the value of U to be maximized. 
(4) A uniquely maximizes U. 
Each of us should choose her component of A. 
This schema captures the most basic features of team reasoning. 
Notice that, because of (2), the schema does not yield any conclu 
sions unless all the members of S identify with this group. Because of 
(4), the schema yields conclusions only when a profile that is the 
unique maximizer of the team payoff function exists. We will not 
address the question of what a team reasoner should do when this is 
not the case but, for our purposes, the answer is not essential. Notice 
also that we can apply Schema 3 in cases in which S contains only one 
individual. In this case, S can be written as {myself}. (1) then becomes 
"I am the only member of the set {myself}." (2) reduces to "I identify 
with {myself}," which amounts to saying that the reasoning individual 
views herself as an agent. And then the schema represents straight 
forward practical reasoning by an individual agent. Thus, Schema 3 
encompasses both individual and team reasoning. 
Schema 3 represents a mode of reasoning that can be used by 
people as a group. What does it mean for a number of people to 
reason as a group? One way to make sense of this is to imagine those 
people in an open meeting, at which each of a set of premises is 
announced, and acknowledged as true by each person. Then, the 
inference to be drawn from those premises is announced, and ac 
knowledged as valid by each person. In such a setting, it is common 
knowledge among the members of the group that each of them 
accepts the relevant premises. That this is common knowledge does 
not need to be stated explicitly in the schema; it is not an additional 
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premise, but a presupposition of the whole idea of reasoning as 
a group. 
For many purposes, however, it is more convenient to represent 
team reasoning from the viewpoint of an individual team member. 
If we adopt this approach, Schema 3 can be rewritten as follows: 
Schema 4: Simple Team Reasoning (from an individual viewpoint) 
(1) 1 am a member of S. 
(2) It is common knowledge in S that each member of S identifies with S. 
(3) It is common knowledge in S that each member of S wants the value 
of U to be maximized. 
(4) It is common knowledge in S that A uniquely maximizes U. 
I should choose my component of A. 
Schema 4 represents team reasoning as a mode of reasoning that can 
be used by an individual group member. If it is common knowledge 
that every member of the group identifies with the group and wants 
the group's payoff function to be maximized, and if it is also common 
knowledge that a particular profile of actions A uniquely maximizes 
that function, then premises (1) to (4) are accessible to each mem 
ber. Each can then reason independently to the conclusion that she 
should choose her component of A. 
Team reasoning was originally introduced to explain how, when 
individuals are pursuing collective goals, it can be rational to choose 
strategies that realize scope for common gain. But it also provides an 
account of the formation of collective intentions. Team reasoning, 
as represented by Schema 4, results in the formation of intentions. 
An individual who accepts premises (1) to (4) and infers "I should 
choose my component of A" has reason to form the intention to 
choose that component. That intention, if formed, is a mental state 
of an individual person. Nevertheless, references to the group are 
noneliminable parts of the reasoning process that led to the forma 
tion of the intention. Thus, it is natural to regard the intentions that 
result from team reasoning as collective intentions. 
Interpreted in this way, our analysis does everything Searle asked 
for. The "we-ness" of we-intentions is primitive, in the sense that group 
agency is a noneliminable part of the reasoning process by which these 
intentions are formed. The presence of group agency also explains 
the distinctive phenomenology of we-intentions. Collective goals (in 
the form of the group payoff function U) play a fundamental role 
in the analysis. I-intentions are derived from we-intentions in the move 
from Schema 2, through Schema 3, to Schema 4. The resulting in 
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dividual intention dovetails with an alternative to Searle's analysis 
proposed by Nicholas Bardsley,33 which is intended to be compatible 
with team reasoning.34 
Our analysis allows us to distinguish collective intentions from the 
individual intentions that exist in Nash equilibrium, and thus to solve 
the general problem we identified in the literature of collective in 
tentions. This distinction can be made by referring to the unit of 
agency in the reasoning process that led to the formation of the 
relevant intentions. Nash equilibrium, as normally understood, is a 
relationship between the strategy choices of players who reason as 
individuals (or, equivalently, each of whom identifies with the one 
person group which contains only himself). Correspondingly, the 
intentions which underlie Nash equilibrium are the result of indi 
vidual reasoning. In contrast, collective intentions are the product 
of team reasoning. 
As an illustration, we return to the Hawk-Dove example discussed 
in section i. In this example, it is common knowledge between PI and 
P2 that, in Hawk-Dove interactions, the player in the position of PI 
almost always chooses hawk and the one in the position of P2 almost 
always chooses dove. Expecting P2 to play dove, PI forms the intention 
to play hawk. Expecting PI to play hawk, P2 forms the intention to play 
dove. We posed the question: Does each player have a we-intention 
with respect to (hawk, dove)} To answer this question, we investigate 
the reasoning process by which the intentions were formed. Given his 
belief that P2 will almost certainly choose dove, PI reasons as follows: 
(1) 1 must choose either hawk or dove. 
(2) If I choose hawk, the outcome will (almost certainly) be a payoff of 3. 
(3) If I choose dove, the outcome will (almost certainly) be a payoff of 2. 
(4) I want to achieve a payoff of 3 more than I want to achieve a payoff 
of 2. 
I should choose hawk. 
Reasoning similarly, P2 reaches the conclusion "I should choose 
dove" Both chains of reasoning follow the "individual rationality" 
33 
Bardsley, "On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philoso 
phy," Synthese (forthcoming, 2007). 34 
Bardsley's alternative to "We intend to make the sauce by means of me stirring" 
as Jones's intention would be: "I intend my part of the combination (Jones stirs, Smith 
pours) in circumstances that you and I have this very intention, all of which is to make 
the sauce." In Bardsley's analysis, Smith's intention has exactly the same sense as Jones's 
(although 'you' and T refer to a different people in the two cases). 
This content downloaded from 195.191.67.226 on Tue, 15 Jul 2014 12:55:07 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
128 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
model of Schema 1. We conclude that Pi's and P2's intentions with 
respect to (hawk, dove) are not collective. 
It is an implication of our analysis that a given pattern of behavior 
can be intended either individually or collectively, depending on the 
reasoning which led to it. For example, compare the following two 
stories about Hi-Lo. In the first story, PI and P2 reason as individuals. 
Each forms the belief that the other is just as likely to play one strategy 
as the other. Since this implies that the expected individual payoff 
from choosing high is greater than that from choosing low, each forms 
the intention to choose high. In this case, (high, high) is a Nash equi 
librium in the standard sense, and the players' intentions are not 
collective. In the second story, each of PI and P2 identifies with the 
group {PI, P2} and takes the group payoff function to be one which is 
uniquely maximized by the profile (high, high); all of this is common 
knowledge between them. Each forms the intention to play highas his 
component in this profile. These intentions are collective.35 
III. THEORIES OF GROUP AGENCY 
The pure theory of team reasoning, as presented in the previous 
section of this paper, presupposes that there can be group agency; 
but it is not reliant on any particular theory of how group agency 
comes about or of what the group agent should take as its goals. The 
literature of team reasoning offers a range of possible answers to 
these questions. In this section, we briefly review various theories of 
group agency. Our aim is not to adjudicate between them, but merely 
to indicate the variety of philosophically significant ways in which 
group agency can be interpreted. In the process, we locate Bratman's 
analysis within our framework. 
7/7.2. Team Agency Required by Rationality or Morality. The first 
theorists to discuss team reasoning did so in the context of moral and 
rational requirements on action. In these accounts, what we have 
called "identifying with" a group is construed as an individual's re 
sponse to such requirements. 
Hodgson was the first person to use the Hi-Lo game, as part of 
an argument that rule utilitarianism does not reduce to act utilitari 
anism (op. cit). Expanding on this argument, Regan proposed a form 
of team reasoning in his theory of cooperative utilitarianism. Regan's 
theory is normative; it is commended to all of us in our capacities as 
35 
Because conventional game theory does not recognize group agency, we cannot 
appeal to convention to resolve the question of whether {high, high) is properly called a 
"Nash equilibrium" in this case. It is a Nash equilibrium in relation to the official payoffs 
of the game, but the players are not motivated by these payoffs in the standard way. 
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rational and moral agents. The fundamental principle of this theory 
is that "what each agent ought to do is to co-operate, with whoever else 
is co-operating, in the production of the best consequences possible 
given the behaviour of non-co-operators" (op. ext., p. 124). In a world 
in which everyone is a cooperative utilitarian, Regan's rational and 
moral agents reason according to Schema 4; S is the set of all agents, 
and the value of U is a measure of the overall good of the world. 
Regan's theory also gives recommendations for cases in which not 
everyone is a cooperative utilitarian. The logic of these recommen 
dations can be represented by a variant of team reasoning called 
restricted team reasoning by Bacharach.36 As in Schema 4, S denotes the 
group with which team reasoners identify. However, it is allowed that 
not all members of S in fact identify with S. The set of those mem 
bers of S (the "team" for the purposes of team reasoning) who do so 
identify is denoted by T. Let AT be a profile of actions for the 
members of T. Then restricted team reasoning is represented by the 
following schema: 
Schema 5: Restricted Team Reasoning 
(1) I am a member of T. 
(2) It is common knowledge in T that each member of T identifies 
with S. 
(3) It is common knowledge in T that each member of T wants the value 
of U to be maximized. 
(4) It is common knowledge in T that AT uniquely maximizes U, given 
the actions of nonmembers of T. 
I should choose my component of AT. 
In cooperative utilitarianism, each of us is told to join with as many 
others as are willing to do the same, and to cooperate with them in 
trying to achieve the overall good of the world. In terms of Schema 5, 
S is the set of all people, T is the set of cooperative utilitarians, and the 
value of U is a measure of overall goodness. 
The idea that team reasoning can be required by morality is not 
limited to utilitarians. Anderson presents a Kantian argument for 
the rationality of team reasoning and for its morality when applied to 
the universal community of humanity (op. at). Anderson presents this 
idea while explaining how, in games which offer scope for common 
gain, individuals can rationally treat their joint strategy profile as the 
unit of selection. Her analysis of the "rational basis for committed ac 
36 
Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice. 
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tion" in such games follows the general logic of Schema 4. The analysis 
applies to cases in which a group of individuals identify themselves as 
members of that group, and see their actions as joindy advancing a 
common goal. Under these conditions, it is rational for each member 
of the group to choose her component of the strategy profile that best 
advances the goal. This conclusion is reached by "collective deliber 
ation," structured by the principle that "whatever can count as a reason 
for action for one member of the collective must count as a reason for 
all"; it is rational by virtue of the individual's having reason "to do my 
part in what we are willing together" (op. ext., pp. 28-30). 
Anderson does not claim that practical reason requires individuals 
to identify with any particular groups. Rather, identity is prior to ra 
tional choice, in the sense that "what principle of choice it is rational 
to act on depends on a prior determination of personal identity, of who 
one is" (op. ext., p. 30). However, she holds out the hope that there 
may be "further principles of rational self-identification" which will tell 
us which groups we should identify with (op. cit., p. 32). She maintains 
that morality requires us to transcend our various identities and harmo 
nize their demands, by identifying with a community that comprehends 
them all?the Kantian Kingdom of Ends?but she admits to having 
no argument that this is rationally required (op. cit., p. 37). Similarly 
Kantian aspirations can be found in Hollis's sketch of how team rea 
soning might be used by "citizens of the world" (op. cit., pp. 150-63). 
In a similar vein, Hurley proposes that we (as rational and moral 
agents) should specify agent-neutral goals?that is, goals of which it 
can simply be said that they ought to be pursued, rather than they 
ought to be pursued by some particular agent (op. cit, pp. 136-59). 
Then we should "survey the units of agency that are possible in the 
circumstances at hand and ask what the unit of agency, among those 
possible, should be"; and we should "ask ourselves how we can contribute to 
the realization of the best unit possible in the circumstances." Like Anderson, 
Hurley does not nominate any particular group as the rational one to 
identify with, or any particular goal as the rational one to pursue. 
Nevertheless, the idea seems to be that rationality requires each per 
son to choose the unit of agency in which she participates, and that 
this choice should be governed by goals which are independent of 
the unit of agency. 
III. 2. Team Agency as the Result of Framing. In contrast, Bacharach's 
theory does not allow the unit of agency to be chosen, and does not 
admit the concept of a goal that is not the goal of some agent.37 For 
37 
Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice. 
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Bacharach, whether a particular player identifies with a particular 
group is a matter of "framing." A frame is the set of concepts a player 
uses when thinking about her situation. In order to team reason, a 
player must have the concept "we" in her frame. Bacharach proposes 
that the "we" frame is induced or primed by games which have a prop 
erty that Bacharach calls strong interdependence. Roughly, a game has this 
property if it has a Nash equilibrium which is Pareto-dominated by the 
outcome of some feasible strategy profile.38 Although Bacharach pro 
poses that the perception of this property increases the probability of 
group identification, he does not claim that games with this property 
invariably prime the "we" frame. In particular, although the Prisoner's 
Dilemma exhibits strong interdependence, Bacharach allows that a 
player of this game may frame it either as a single-agent problem for 
"us" or as a game to be played by two separate individual agents. 
In Bacharach's theoretical framework, this dualism is best rep 
resented in terms of circumspect team reasoning. We now present this 
mode of reasoning in the form of a reasoning schema. As before, let S 
be the set of individuals with which team-reasoners identify, and let T 
be any subset of S, interpreted as the set of individuals who in fact 
identify with S. Suppose there is a random process which, inde 
pendently for each member of S, determines whether or not that 
individual is a member of T; for each individual, the probability that 
he is a member of T is co, where a>> 0. We define a proposition p to be 
T-conditional common knowledge if: (i) p is true; (ii) for all individuals i 
in S, if i is a member of T, then i knows p; (ii) for all individuals i and 
j in S, if i is a member of T, then i knows that if j is a member of T, 
then jknows p; and so on. (As an illustration: imagine an underground 
political organization which uses a cell structure, so that each member 
knows the identities of only a few of her fellow-members. New 
members are inducted by taking an oath, which they are told is 
common to the whole organization. Then, if T is the set of members, 
the content of the oath is T-conditional common knowledge.) We de 
fine a protocol s a profile of actions, one for each member of S, with the 
interpretation that the protocol is to be followed by those individuals 
who turn out to be members of T. Let P be any protocol. The schema is: 
Schema 6: Circumspect Team Reasoning 
(1) 1 am a member of T. 
(2) It is T-conditional common knowledge that each member of T iden 
tifies with S. 
38 
For a more formal definition, see Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice. 
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(3) It is T-conditional common knowledge that each member of T wants 
the value of U to be maximized. 
(4) It is T-conditional common knowledge that P uniquely maximizes U, 
given the actions of nonmembers of T. 
I should choose my component of P. 
Bacharach applies this theory to the Prisoner's Dilemma, setting S 
= 
{PI, P2} and interpreting U as a measure of the value of the outcome 
of the game to PI and P2 together; he assumes that U is maximized 
when both players choose cooperate. If the value of U is higher when 
just one player chooses cooperate than when neither does, or if the 
value of co is sufficiently high, the uniquely optimal protocol is (coop 
erate, cooperate). This gives a model in which players of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma choose cooperate if the "we" frame comes to mind, and defect 
otherwise. Bacharach offers this result as an explanation of the ob 
servation that, in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas played under experi 
mental conditions, each of cooperate and defect is usually chosen by a 
substantial proportion of players. 
Bacharach claims that Schema 6 is valid, with the implication that, 
for any given individual, if she identifies with S and wants U to be max 
imized, it is instrumentally rational for her to act as a member of T, 
the team of like-minded individuals. He does not claim that she 
ought to identify with any particular S, or that she ought to want 
any particular U to be maximized. In the theory of circumspect 
team reasoning, the parameter co is interpreted as a property of a 
psychological mechanism?the probability that a person who con 
fronts the relevant stimulus will respond by framing the situation as a 
problem "for us." The idea is that, in coming to frame the situation as 
a problem "for us," an individual also gains some sense of how likely 
it is that another individual would frame it in the same way; in this 
way, the value of co becomes common knowledge among those who 
use this frame. 
III.3. Team Agency and Assurance. Up to now, we have treated 
schemata of practical reasoning as modes of valid reasoning, 'validity' 
being interpreted instrumentally. Thus, team reasoning has been 
presented as an element of the theory of rational choice. Sugden 
offers an alternative approach, presenting a "logic of team reasoning" 
without making any claims for its validity.39 In this analysis, a "logic" is 
merely an internally consistent system of axioms and inference rules. 
39 
Sugden, "The Logic of Team Reasoning." 
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An individual actor may endorse a particular logic, thereby accepting 
as true any conclusions that can be derived within it, but the theorist 
need not take any position about whether the axioms of that logic 
are "really" true or whether its inference rules are "really" valid. Team 
reasoning is then represented as a particular inference rule which, 
as a matter of empirical fact, many people endorse. 
Sugden is particularly concerned with the following assurance ques 
tion: When a team reasoner chooses her component of the profile 
that maximizes her team's payoff, does she have the assurance that 
other members of the team are choosing their components too? If 
one asserts (as Sugden does not) that the relevant schema of team 
reasoning is valid, one can give the following straightforward answer: 
if the team members know one another to be rational, this knowledge 
provides the necessary assurance. To see why, consider the simplest 
schema of team reasoning, Schema 4. Notice that this schema tells 
an individual member of S to choose his component of the U 
maximizing profile only in situations in which it also tells the other 
members to choose theirs. Thus, if each member is rational in the 
sense of being capable of valid practical reasoning and having the 
motivation to act on the conclusions it generates, each will act on 
the conclusions of Schema 4, as applied to his case. And, since it is 
common knowledge in S that everyone identifies with S, each player 
has the resources to work all this out. So, whenever Schema 4 tells an 
individual to choose his component of the U-maximizing profile, that 
individual has the assurance that the others, if rational, will choose 
theirs too.40 But since Sugden's approach does not acknowledge 
agent-neutral concepts of "validity" and "rationality," assurance has to 
be generated in a different way. 
Following David Lewis41 and Robin Cubitt and Sugden,42 Sugden 
uses a theoretical framework in which the central concept is reason to 
believe. To say that a person has reason to believe a proposition p is to 
say that p can be inferred from propositions than she accepts as true, 
using rules of inference that she accepts as valid. On the analogue of 
40 
This argument extends to the cases of restricted and circumspect team reasoning, 
in the sense that each team-reasoning individual has the assurance that other members 
of T, the "team" of like-minded individuals, will choose their components of the pro 
file or protocol which maximizes the value of the team's payoff function. However, a 
member of T may know with certainty (in the case of restricted team reasoning) or with 
high probability (in the case of circumspect team reasoning) that other members of S 
will act as individual agents?for example, by choosing defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma. 41 
Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Harvard, 1969). 42 Cubitt and Sugden, "Common Knowledge, Salience, and Convention," Economics 
and Philosophy, xix (2003): 175-210. 
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the definition of common knowledge, there is common reason to believe 
a proposition p in a set of individuals T if: (i) for all individuals fin T, i 
has reason to believe p; (ii) for all individuals i and j in T, zhas reason 
to believe that j has reason to believe p; (iii) for all individuals i,j, and 
k in T, i has reason to believe that j has reason to believe that k has 
reason to believe p; and so on. 
The following definition is also useful.43 Within a set of individuals 
T, there is reciprocal reason to believe that some property q holds for 
members of T if (i) for all individuals i and j in T, where i ? j, i has 
reason to believe that q holds for j; (ii) for all individuals i,j, and kin 
T, where i ? /and j ^ k, i has reason to believe that j has reason to 
believe that q holds for k; and so on. To see the point of this latter 
definition, consider the Prisoner's Dilemma and let qbe the property 
'chooses cooperate'. In a schema of practical reasoning which is 
intended to be used by (say) PI in deciding how to play the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, we cannot allow the premise that, in the group {PI, P2}, 
there is common reason to believe that PI chooses cooperate. That 
would make it a premise that PI has reason to believe that he himself 
will choose cooperate, when the whole point of using the schema is to 
determine which action he should choose. However, we can allow the 
premise that there is reciprocal reason to believe that members of {PI, 
P2} choose cooperate, and there may be circumstances in which such a 
premise would be natural. For example, suppose that PI and P2 have 
played the Prisoner's Dilemma many times before, and on every such 
occasion, both have chosen cooperate. They are about to play again, 
and there is no obvious difference between this interaction and all its 
predecessors. Then, by induction, PI might have reason to believe 
that P2 will choose cooperate. Attributing similar reasoning to his 
opponent, PI might have reason to believe that P2 has reason to 
believe that PI will choose cooperate] and so on. 
Sugden's formulation of team reasoning can be represented as the 
following schema: 
Schema 7: Mutually Assured Team Reasoning 
(1) 1 am a member of S. 
(2) I identify with S and acknowledge U as its objective. 
(3) In S, there is reciprocal reason to believe that every member of 
S identifies with S and acknowledges U as the objective of S. 
43 
The concept we define here is similar to that of "reciprocal" belief, used by 
Frederic Schick, "Surprise, Self-Knowledge, and Commonality," this journal, xcvii, 
8 (August 2000): 440-53. 
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(4) In S, there is reciprocal reason to believe that every member of 
S endorses and acts on mutually assured team reasoning. 
(5) In S, there is common reason to believe that A uniquely maximizes U. 
I should choose my component of A. 
This schema is presented merely as a mode of reasoning that any 
person might (or might not) endorse; a person commits herself to 
team reasoning by endorsing the schema. Notice that premises (2) 
and (3) refer to "acknowledging U as the objective of S" rather than 
"wanting U to be maximized." On Sugden's account, a team reasoner 
who identifies with a group stands ready to do her part in joint actions 
in pursuit of the group's objective; but she does not necessarily take 
this objective as hers in the stronger sense of wanting to pursue it even 
if other members of the group do not reciprocate. 
This schema is recursive: premise (4) refers to the endorsement 
of the schema itself. That this is not circular can be seen from an 
analogy. Consider an international treaty which includes among its 
conditions that it will come into effect only if and when it has been 
ratified by a certain number of nations; once this condition is met, 
it is binding on every nation that has ratified it. To ratify such a treaty 
is to make a commitment which is binding from that moment, but 
which is activated only if enough others make the same commitment. 
Analogously, to endorse mutually assured team reasoning is to make 
a unilateral commitment to a certain form of practical reasoning, 
but this reasoning does not generate any implications for action un 
less one has assurance that others have made the same commitment. 
Such assurance could be created by public acts of commitment of a 
kind we will discuss in the following subsection. But it could also be 
induced by repeated experience of regularities of behavior in a popu 
lation. For example, suppose that in some population, some practice 
of mutual assistance (say, giving directions to strangers when asked) is 
generally followed in anonymous encounters. Each individual might 
interpret the existence of the practice as evidence that premises (3), (4) 
and (5) are true. If so, each individual would be assured that others 
would choose their components of the U-maximizing profile. But he 
would still have to decide whether team reasoning was a mode of rea 
soning that he wanted to endorse. 
Ill A. Team Agency Produced by Commitment. A final variety of team 
agency has it that a group is constituted by public acts of promising, 
or by public expressions of commitment by its members. This latter 
idea is central to Gilbert's analysis of "plural subjects" (op. cit). Al 
though Gilbert is more concerned with collective attitudes than with 
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collective action, her analysis of how a plural subject is formed might 
be applied to the formation of teams. There are also hints of this ap 
proach in the work of Hollis (op. cit.). Hollis suggests that Rousseau's 
account of the social contract,44 with its "most remarkable change in 
man," can be understood as a transition from individual to group 
agency that takes place through a collective act of commitment. 
Although Gilbert does not offer an explicit model of collective 
choice, we suggest that Schema 4 is compatible with her general 
approach, provided that "identifying with" the group S is understood 
as some kind of conscious act of commitment. On this interpreta 
tion, the schema is asserted to be rational, but not in an instrumental 
sense. Rather, the rationality of acting as a member of a team derives 
from the rationality of fulfilling one's commitments or intentions. 
Focusing on collective attitudes rather than collective actions, Gilbert 
claims that membership of a plural subject imposes obligations to 
uphold "our" attitudes. This claim is conceptual rather than moral: 
roughly, the idea is that a plural subject is formed by an exchange of 
commitments, and that to make a commitment is to impose on 
oneself an obligation to act on it. For Gilbert, there is no problem that 
S (the group with which individuals identify) may be different from T 
(the set of individuals who in fact identify with S). In commitment 
based theories, it is natural to assume that the set of individuals who 
act as a team is the same as the group with which they identify, 
provided we can assume that individuals keep their commitments. 
We suggest that Bratman's analysis of shared intention can be under 
stood as an account of group agency produced by commitment, even 
though he does not elaborate on how that commitment comes about. 
Given Bratman's "planning concept of intention," we can identify two 
levels of intentions: agents form high-level, strategic intentions, which 
guide the practical reasoning that leads to low-level, tactical intentions. 
Strategic intentions set the framework within which subsequent tacti 
cal reasoning takes place. Bratman's analysis is at the strategic level. 
Recall that, in shared cooperative activity, each agent has the intention 
that "we" perform some joint activity through the meshing of "my" sub 
plans with "yours." This intention is not linked to any particular com 
bination of subplans; rather, it expresses a commitment to engage with 
the other in a process of "mutual responsiveness" and "mutual support" 
which is directed towards the meshing of sub-plans in general. In this 
sense, the shared intentions are "interlocking" and "end-providing."45 
44 
Rousseau, "The Social Contract" (1762) in Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway 
Bondanella, eds., Rousseau's Political Writings (New York: Norton, 1988). 45 
"Shared Cooperative Activity" p. 335. 
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In later work, Bratman associates shared intentions with "shared valu 
ing," a shared policy that says what considerations are to be given 
justifying significance and which provides a background framework 
for shared deliberation. This would be the analogue of the team pay 
off function.46 It seems that, for Bratman, collective intentionality 
expresses a disposition to reason and act as a member of a group in 
relation to the objective of executing some broadly-defined joint 
activity. His analysis leaves open the question of how, at the tactical 
stage, the members of a group coordinate their actions so that to 
gether they achieve their joint objective. 
Since this is the central question addressed by the theory of 
team reasoning, the two approaches can be seen as complementary. 
Bratman's planning conception of shared intention can be thought 
of as the counterpart in the domain of intentions of group identifi 
cation in the domain of practical reasons. Seen in this light, Bratman 
is providing a reductionist account of group agency itself, in terms of 
the mental states of the individual members of the group. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have identified a general problem in the literature of collective 
intentions, that of how to distinguish between the "we-intentions" 
that lie behind cooperative actions and the mutually consistent "I 
intentions" that lie behind Nash equilibrium behavior. We have 
argued that the problem arises because, for this purpose at least, the 
analyses in the collective intention literature have the wrong starting 
point. The key difference between the two kinds of intention is not a 
property of the intentions themselves, but of the modes of reasoning 
by which they are formed. Thus, an analysis which starts with the 
intention has already missed what is distinctively collective about it. 
In our analysis, collective intentions are the product of a distinctive 
mode of practical reasoning, team reasoning, in which agency is 
attributed to groups. We have presented the core features of team 
reasoning in the form of explicit schemata, discussed a range of pos 
sible accounts of group agency, and shown how existing theories of 
collective intentions fit into this framework. 
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46Bratman, "Shared Valuing and Frameworks for Practical Reasoning," in R. Jay 
Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith eds., Reason and Value: 
Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (New York: Oxford, 2004), pp. 1-27. 
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